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Foreword
During the last two decades, Latin American countries have brought about important reforms in
infrastructure services, encompassing changes both in ownership patterns and in opera ting terms.
Regulatory frameworks have also evolved from monopoly and public ownership settings lacking
specific regulations, towards scenarios where pr ivate participation prevails, with competition and
regulation playing complementary roles. However, even though comp etition is a pivotal feature to all
public services r eform processes, a high degree of vertical and horizontal concentration pervades
within the industrial structure of many of the region’s countries. Furthermore, mer gers and
acquisitions taking place in the context of an increa singly global economy, without the appropriate
legislation geared at promoting competition and restraining market control, have often led to reduced
levels of competition for the market or in the market.
The Interamerican Development Bank has actively promoted infrastructure reform develo pment in
Latin America. The Bank has also financed private projects aimed at fostering the i mplementation of
reforms in the power, gas, water, and transport sectors. The reforms have succeeded in fostering
private participation. Because of the reforms, Latin American countries were able to attract private
participation to infrastructure sectors like telecommunications, transportation, energy, and potable
water and sewerage. Private participation in infrastructure has reduced public deficits and introduced
new technologies. In addition of efficiency improvements, private sector has extended infrastructure
services to more consumers.
These reforms seem less successful in promoting effective competition in infrastructure sectors, which
is the other building block of the reforms. Indicators showing weak competition in the region's
infrastructure sectors are found in most countries. In this context the Infrastructure and Financial
Market Division of the Interamerican Development Bank is developing a pr ogram, Competition
Policy in Infrastructure Sectors, consisting in identifying competition problem in infrastructure
sectors and the legal and structural reasons that may provoke them. This program also includes the
analysis and discussion of competition regulations appropriate to pr omote competition in
infrastructure services in developing countries
This article , Competition in Infrastructures for Developing Countries, is part of the set of publications
included in this program.  This paper summarizes the desirable departures from the practices of
developed countries that are called for the specificities in less developed essentially on the basis of
normative economic theory. The paper pr ovides a useful framework for those who have the difficult
task of advising these cou ntries in the implementation of more efficient ways to provide public
services. Nevertheless, as the paper points out that more empirical work is needed to characterize
more precisely the specific features of less deve loped countries that are relevant for regulatory
economics. Such a work should naturally lead to distinguish various stages of development and to
obtain a classification of countries calling for different iated policies.
Pietro Masci
Chief
Infrastructure and Financial Markets Division
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11.  Introduction
This paper focuses on public utilities (tele-
communications, electricity, gas, water,
transportation (roads, railways, buses, ports,
airports,… ) and postal service), which are
sometimes referred to as economic infra-
structures. It does not concern itself with the
so-called social infrastructures such as edu-
cation and health, or with the financial in-
frastructures. There is little debate today
regarding the fact that, when possible, pub-
lic utilities should be privatized (although
several African countries did not succeed in
doing so). As a result, this paper will not
cover issues of privatization. It will, instead,
discuss the specific questions surrounding
the regulation and liberalization of public
utilities in developing countries. To that
end, this section of the report recaps the
characteristics of developing countries that
have a bearing on the analysis of regulation
and competition policy.
An essential concept in this discussion is the
marginal cost of public funds, that is, the
social cost of raising one unit of funds. This
cost includes a deadweight loss1 because
governments raise revenues by means of
distortionary taxes. It is estimated that this
deadweight loss amounts to 0.3 in devel-
oped countries, meaning that it costs citi-
zens 1.3 units of account every time that the
government raises 1 unit. The inefficiency
of tax systems in developing countries, cou-
pled with the corruption that is sometimes
also present, makes it extremely difficult for
governments to invest in infrastructures and
affects the cost of all types of public inter-
ventions, particularly, regulation and com-
petition policy.  According to World Bank
data, the deadweight loss in developing
countries is well beyond 1. It has been esti-
mated at 1.2 in Malaysia and 2.5 in The
                                               
1 The deadweight loss depends on the type of tax
used because the tax systems are not usually opti-
mized.
Philippines, while in Thailand it ranges
between 1.2 and 1.5 (Jones, Tandon and
Vogelsang, 1990; Mookherjee, 1998).  In
developing our analysis we take the high
cost of public funds as a given because, al-
though tax reforms are necessary in many
developing countries, it is unlikely that they
will be in place quickly owing to the many
financial, human and political variables in-
volved.
An essential instrument of regulatory and
competition agencies is the ability to audit
costs. Yet, developing countries are ham-
pered by a lack of well-developed account-
ing and auditing systems (Trebilcock,
1996). This is due to the lack of proper
training programs; to the political and social
difficulties that hamper the payment of in-
centive salaries to auditors to  reward effort
and discourage corruption; to the lack of up-
to-date technology such as computerized
systems (which makes it harder to discover
cost padding and evaluate real costs); and to
the inability to impose high penalties in
cases of documented wrongdoing (because
of the strong limited liability constraints of
most economic agents).
Many developing countries also suffer from
widespread corruption due, in particular, to
the low internal costs of side transfers.
When two parties (such as a firm and an
auditor or a bidder and the auction organ-
izer) arrange a private deal, they must take
into account the costs of being discovered
and the need to use indirect compensation
(which is less efficient than direct compen-
sation). The cost of these side transfers is
expected to be lower in developed countries
because they are more difficult to identify
and, in addition, social norms may place a
positive value  on some types of side trans-
fers (for example, when they take place
within families, villages or ethnic groups).
Accordingly, it is more difficult to fight
corruption (Tirole, 1992).
2Inefficient credit markets and the sheer lack
of wealth make limited liability constraints
more binding in developing countries. It is
important to stress this point because many
of the problems in regulation and competi-
tion policy result from difficulties in bor-
rowing and attracting foreign capital. It is
also worth highlighting the complementarity
of general competition policy and good
banking sector regulation. When the bank-
ing sector is inefficient and makes borrow-
ing costly or impossible, an effective com-
petition policy may destroy the rents that
allow firms to invest, or may create insta-
bility.2
Other developing country characteristics
that hamper public utility regulation concern
the government. In particular, two charac-
teristics of developed countries that are of-
ten missing in developing countries are con-
stitutional control of the government and
some degree of ability to enter into long-
term contracts. The lack of the checks and
balances typical of  well-functioning de-
mocracies (supreme courts, government
auditing bodies, separation of powers, inde-
pendent media3) makes the developing
country governments an easier prey to inter-
est groups and patronage. The lack of politi-
cal democracy and well-functioning politi-
cal institutions increases the uncertainty of
future regulations and makes it difficult for
the government and the regulatory institu-
tions to make credible commitments to
long-run policies. Consequently, the eco-
nomic policies of developing countries are
even more sensitive to ratchet effects and
renegotiations.
                                               
2 Mishkin (1997) concludes that "developing coun-
tries may need to move slowly in financial liberali-
zation in order to keep a lending boom from getting
out of hand".
3 See Besley and Burgess (2001) for an empirical
study of government responsiveness to media activ-
ity.
Another shortcoming of developing econo-
mies is the weakness of the rule of law. Poor
enforcement of laws and contracts biases
contracting toward self-enforcing contracts
or leads to renegotiations.
Finally, it is essential to stress that the liber-
alization and deregulation of public infra-
structures in developing countries often fails
to attract the level of foreign capital that is
necessary.
These features will be kept in mind
throughout the discussion that follows, and
when necessary specific advise for dealing
with these difficulties in regulating and
promoting competition in public utilities
will be presented.
Section 2 discusses the structuring of regu-
latory agencies that favor competition, and
the trade-offs involved in choosing whether
or not to engage in the vertical disintegra-
tion of incumbent monopolies between the
competitive segments and the natural mo-
nopoly ones. Section 3 presents the regula-
tory rules required by the monopoly seg-
ments in developing countries. The crucial
issue of the management of the interface
between the monopoly segments and the
competitive segments is addressed in Sec-
tion 4 where access-pricing rules adapted to
developing nations are discussed in greater
detail. Section 5 is devoted to competition
policy per se for the segments opened to
competition. Concluding comments are of-
fered in Section 6.
32.  Structural Issues
THE STRUCTURE
OF REGULATORY AGENCIES
A first consideration in structuring the
government entity that will have responsi-
bility for regulation and competition policy
is whether these functions should be the
purview of one integrated agency or sepa-
rated ones. In this regard, recent experi-
ence in Australia and New Zealand is en-
lightening.
New Zealand employed a very novel ap-
proach to regulation, relying only on gen-
eral competition laws enforced by the
courts and by an industry-wide competi-
tion authority. This approach was first
used to regulate telecommunications and
then power. The notion of self-regulation
by industry was also introduced. In this
case, industry participants form councils
to negotiate the main rules and access con-
ditions.
Although New Zealand's experiment was
not an immediate failure, the government
recognized, after some years, that there
was still a need for regulatory control of
industries that are not competitive enough.
Indeed, this proved necessary even in tele-
communications, which is the most com-
petitive industry of the ones we are con-
sidering here. The concern is that light
control of the industry is not sufficient to
contain abuse of dominant position. The
number of cases brought before the courts
show that rapid technological change and
the technology intensive nature of the in-
dustry make it difficult to find a firm
guilty of abuse of dominant position.
Moreover, the procedures involved make
for very long delays. As a result, relying
solely on competition laws has proved
inefficient even when these laws are well
developed and enforced. On the basis of
this experience, therefore, we can conclude
that eschewing regulation is not the right
option.
Integrating general competition policy and
regulation into a single agency is only pos-
sible if the regulatory agency is a multi-
industry one as in Australia. Australian
regulation is organized around a federal
multisectoral agency (the Australian Com-
petition and Consumer Commission,
ACCC), specialized agencies, and regional
regulation. The ACCC is composed of
sectoral and functional bureaus and coor-
dination entities. The Commission deals
with product safety, consumer protection,
access, mergers and restrictive trade prac-
tices in all the sectors under study in this
report.
The ACCC was created in 1995 following
the recommendations of the Himler Re-
port. It has taken over a non-negligible
part of the duties of specialized regulators
by acquiring responsibility for promoting
competition in a larger sense. For example,
the regulatory body responsible for tele-
communications was closed after the crea-
tion of the ACCC. The Utility Regulators
Forum, created in 1997, is responsible for
coordinating regulatory activities within
the ACCC. The Australian case involves
integration at the federal level of regula-
tion and competition, even if regional
agencies are also used. This system can be
compared to the one prevailing in the
United States where multisectoral ruling
takes place at the state level, specialized
regulation is the responsibility of the fed-
eral government, and competition policy is
dealt with separately.
Integrated regulatory agencies are an at-
tractive option for developing countries
because they face a significant shortfall in
adequately trained personnel. This is espe-
cially the case for the telecommunications,
4electricity, gas, water and transportation
industries. While there are substantial
economies of scope between the regulatory
institutions of those industries, they seem
much less important between regulation
and competition policy. To avoid creating
a too powerful institution, we would gen-
erally favor a separate competition agency
and, except for very large countries, inte-
grated regulatory agencies at the federal
level. The only exception might be water,
which could remain at the local level.
Technological intensity requires federal
regulation to reduce costs, but account-
ability requires more decentralized institu-
tions.
Good advice on this structural issue must
take into account political constraints, ini-
tial conditions and industry specifics. The
variety of solutions implemented in devel-
oped countries and the experience of vari-
ous Latin American countries (Argentina,
Chile, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia and others)
suggest that the trade-offs are complex.
They involve balancing differentiation
versus coordination; creative versus de-
structive competition between regulators
(see Laffont and Pouyet, 2000); better en-
forcement by local authorities versus better
control by the government; local corrup-
tion versus federal corruption (see Bardhan
and Mookherjee, 1999); industry specific
expertise versus sharing resources; and
diversifying the risks of institutional fail-
ures versus coordination (Aubert and Laf-
font, 2000; Smith, 2000).
THE STRUCTURE
OF THE INDUSTRY
The industries under consideration were
formerly public (or private) natural mo-
nopolies providing public services such as
telecommunications, electricity, gas or
transportation. Segments of these indus-
tries are now viewed as potentially com-
petitive. Some examples are long distance
telecommunications service and electricity
generation. These are, therefore, the seg-
ments opened to competition. Other seg-
ments continue to be considered natural
monopolies. These include, for example,
the electricity transmission grid, railway
tracks, and the local loop in telecommuni-
cations. These industry segments remain
regulated and may eventually face new
forms of regulation (see Section 3).
Three types of market structures can be
envisioned for these industries: (1) vertical
disintegration, (2) vertical integration and
(3) competition in infrastructures.  Under
vertical disintegration the firm controlling
the bottleneck (the natural monopoly seg-
ment) is not allowed to compete in the
Box 1
A Compromise between Coordination and Specialization: Bolivia
Bolivia's recently established regulatory system constitutes a balanced compromise
between a multisectoral agency and specialized regulators. It is composed of sector-
specific branches that are under the supervision of a coordination entity. The struc-
ture is very similar to that of a multisectoral agency with specialized bureaus; yet, it
allows more independence to the branches. This, in turn, makes it more acceptable
to the ministries, which might be reluctant to turn their regulatory power over to a
multisectoral agency.
Such an organization may help reduce the threat of capture of regulators by the in-
dustry but may not insulate the agency from political interference in view of its
strategic importance.
5services using the bottleneck as an input.
For example, the local telephone company
owning the local loop is not allowed to
compete in long distance service using the
local loop to access consumers. In the case
of vertical integration, the firm controlling
the bottleneck becomes one more com-
petitor among many service providers us-
ing the bottleneck as an input. Finally, in
the case of competition in infrastructures,
competition then takes place between ver-
tically integrated firms, each of which
controls a  restricted access point and pro-
vides services.
The comparison between the first two
cases raises the issue of the economies of
scope that vertical integration makes pos-
sible, and the problems of favoritism it
raises. The bias in developing countries
should be toward vertical disintegration
because the economies of scope are likely
to be independent of the characteristics of
these countries (at least for given tech-
nologies), while favoritism is more diffi-
cult to counter.4 Cases 2 and 3 rest on a
                                               
4 This should be balanced with another considera-
tion; namely, the importance of transaction costs.
This will be higher in case 1 due to the lack of
enforceability of contracts and the lack of commit-
ment, which produces constant renegotiations. See
comparison of the fixed costs associated
with competition in the provision of the
"bottleneck" (like local telephony) and the
gains one may expect from this competi-
tion (Auriol and Laffont, 1992). The com-
parison is difficult for developing coun-
tries where the high cost of public funds
makes more expensive both the duplica-
tion of fixed costs and the information
rents resulting from a monopolistic provi-
sion of the bottleneck.
These comparisons are further complicated
by the dynamics of the industry, which
may be moving towards case 3, as in tele-
communications. Then, vertical disinte-
gration may in fact slow down the emer-
gence of competition among vertically
integrated firms providing both local and
long distance telephony. Recommending
vertical disintegration may then be par-
ticularly inappropriate. However, for rail-
ways,5 gas or electricity, vertical disinte-
                                                                   
also Ordover et al. (1994). Another consideration in
small countries and some industries such as elec-
tricity, is that only a vertical structure provides a
critical level of business to attract the interest of
foreign investors.
5 Except maybe where competition by roads or (for
large countries) competition between vertically
Box 2
Market Structure of Telecommunications Infrastructure Providers
Zambia aimed at a very competitive industry with two fixed link telephony providers and
three mobiles, but was unable to attract any investor. Ghana issued two licenses for  fixed
link telephony but the weakness of regulation did not prevent foreclosure behavior by the
incumbent monopolist so that the second operator is not operational. Côte d'Ivoire was
criticized for granting a seven years monopoly for fixed link telephony, but the network
is now expanding as scheduled.
The telecommunications sector in Peru was privatized in 1994 and a seven-year monop-
oly in fixed phone services was granted to force large investments that increase coverage
and penetration and allow for a smooth restructuring of tariffs. In 1998 the monopoly
(Telefonica) and Peruvian authorities renegotiated the contract and opened all services to
competition.
6gration of the track, the pipelines or the
electric transmission grid from transporta-
tion or the generation can be recom-
mended if competition in services is intro-
duced.
In all these cases there is a choice between
a single regulated entity that owns the
tracks, the pipelines, or the grid, or shared
ownership of the bottleneck by users who
agree on rules for using it. The comparison
here is between the inefficiency of regula-
tion and the free-rider problems of joint
ownership. In a country where regulation
is easily captured one may favor the sec-
ond alternative, despite the lack of con-
sumer representation that it entails.
                                                                   
integrated firms interconnected with reciprocal
access rules is possible.
A particular problem for the gas industry is
the market power of producers, especially
when there are foreign producers involved.
The bargaining power of consumers with
respect to producers may be enhanced by
the existence of a vertically integrated
network operator who also owns gas
fields. This argument is used in Europe
with respect to the supply by Algeria, Rus-
sia and Norway, and also in Argentina
where YPF (recently acquired by Repsol)
sells more than 60 percent of the gas pro-
duced.6
More generally, there is a question about
the affordable competitiveness of the mar-
ket structure, given that developing coun-
tries also need to attract foreign capital
(see Box 2).
                                               
6 Since 1993, prices at the wellhead have increased
by about 17 percent in real terms. Enargas is con-
sidering presenting the case before the Competition
Commission.
73. Regulation and Development
The regulation of natural monopolies re-
quires finding a balance between effi-
ciency and the cost of the information
rents. High-powered incentive schemes
(such as price caps) that induce cost mini-
mizing behavior yield large rents to the
most efficient firms, while low-powered
incentive schemes (such as cost of service
regulation) control those rents but create
weak incentives for minimizing costs.
THE HIGH COST OF
PUBLIC FUNDS
As stressed above, a major characteristic
of developing countries is the high cost of
public funds. It is easy to see that this high
cost calls for higher prices of the com-
modities produced by the natural monop-
oly and for lower-powered incentive
schemes (high shares of cost reimburse-
ment). Before presenting the intuitive rea-
soning for these results, it is important to
emphasize that we are assuming perfect
observability of cost and full commitment
of the regulator.
Intuitively, we know that higher costs of
public funds mean a higher cost of giving
up rents and also a higher inefficiency
cost. However, the relative cost of rents
increases faster because when an addi-
tional rent is given up to a particular firm
to support an efficiency improvement,  the
same incentive must also be provided to all
the more efficient firms. The optimal
regulation sacrifices some efficiency in
order to decrease such rents. Thus, this is
an argument in favor of cost-plus schemes
relative to fixed-price schemes or, in the
language of regulatory theory, rate of re-
turn regulation versus price caps.
A higher cost of funds also means that it is
more valuable to price above marginal
cost, i.e., to use public utilities prices to
finance fixed costs and the government's
budget. In particular, it is a mistake to ad-
vocate marginal cost pricing for public
utilities in developing countries.
The implied difference in pricing between
developed and developing countries can be
substantial, since a move from a cost of
funds of 0.3 to 1 translates into a relative
deviation from marginal cost that is double
in the second case. Since effort levels also
decrease as cost reimbursement rules are
tilted toward cost-plus schemes, marginal
costs are higher and, therefore, prices
should be even higher in developing
countries. We illustrate this point in Box 3.
MONITORING
The impact of monitoring on the power of
incentives is quite different depending on
the type of monitoring.
Monitoring of effort generally enables the
regulator to reduce the information rents
and calls for higher-powered incentive
schemes. A less-efficient monitoring tech-
nology will call for relatively less-
powerful incentive schemes. Indeed, low
incentives and monitoring are substitute
instruments to extract the firm's rent. A
decrease in the use of one instrument
makes the other instrument more attrac-
tive. As a result, an increase in the cost of
public funds induces low incentives both
directly and indirectly (as explained
above) through a decrease of the more
costly monitoring.
8Box 3
The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off.
Suppose there are three units of production with costs 1 2 3b b b< <  at the zero effort
level induced by cost plus regulation. As costs are fully reimbursed, no rent is given up
to the firm and the consumers' bill is 1 2 3b b b+ +  or the gray area in Figure 1.
Price cap regulation induces in each unit of production an effort *e  that decreases
monetary cost by *e  at a disutility cost *( )ey  for the firm. Total costs are then
* * * * * *
1 1 2 2 3 3( ), ( ), ( )e e e e e eb b y b b y b b y= - + = - + = - +% % % . Production of the
less efficient unit calls for a price of 3b% , hence a bill for consumers of 3 3b%  (dotted
area in Figure 1)
Figure 1
3b
1 2 3
B
A
C
3b%
2b
1b
1b%
'
3b%
9If the firm's rent is not taken into account, the comparison between cost plus and price
cap regulations reduces to the difference of consumers' bills,7 i.e., the difference be-
tween the triangles A and B. If A > B (resp. A < B), price cap (resp. cost plus) domi-
nates.
However, if the firm's rent (triangle '1 3 3b b b% % % or C in Figure 1) enters the regulator's
objective function with a weight a , price cap dominates if B A Ca- < , i.e., if the
consumers' bill differential is less that the social valuation of the firm's rent.
If the regulator does not care about giving up a rent to the firm ( 1)a = , price cap al-
ways dominates (since C > B). However, when giving up a rent is socially costly, cost
plus regulation may dominate.
In industries where transfers of public money are possible (railways, buses… ), the cost
of giving up a rent to the firm increases with the cost of public funds.8 Accordingly, in
developing countries with a high cost of public funds, the trade-off is tilted towards
cost-plus regulation. In industries where transfers are not allowed (telecommunications,
energy) the social weight attributed to the firm's profit does not bear any direct relation-
ship with the cost of public funds and the optimal trade-off between rent extraction and
efficiency is not affected necessarily by the cost of public funds.9
If differences of cost across units are larger (i.e. asymmetric information is more seri-
ous) as it is likely in developing countries, for example if the cost spread increases with
a constant mean, it increases B -  A in Figure 1 and favors cost plus. However, taking
into account C weakens this effect (see Figure 2 where we draw A, B before (dotted tri-
angles) and after (gray triangles) the increase in the cost spread).
If the differences of costs are higher in an industry than in another, for example higher
in telecommunications than in power transmission, price cap is relatively favored in
power transmission.
7 For simplicity, we assume that the indivisibility is such that under both regulations all three
units are operated.
8 Since each unit of account taken from the firm allows a decrease of the deadweight loss of the
tax needed to raise one unit of account (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
10 However, the higher the prices the more disconnections to the service are likely, and this may
call for social funds to balance this negative effect.
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Figure 2
We have emphasized so far the strong as-
sumption of perfect observability of costs.
In practice, however, costs are not per-
fectly observable and one must also take
into account the possibility of cost pad-
ding, i.e., the many ways in which a firm
can divert money. Cost can now be in-
creased by undue charges, which benefit
the management and the workers. The
analysis (Laffont and Tirole 1993) shows
that the imperfect auditing of cost padding
calls for a shift towards higher-power in-
centive schemes. In the extreme, if audit-
ing did not exist, only fixed-price contracts
would be possible. Indeed, they would be
the only ones preventing unlimited cost
padding by making firms residual claim-
ants of their costs. It is therefore very ob-
vious that weak auditing technology, as
can be expected in developing countries,
will result in an even higher desire to shift
toward fixed-price mechanisms. This ef-
fect is reinforced by the savings in auditing
costs resulting from fixed-price mecha-
nisms in countries with a high cost of pub-
lic funds.
The impact of the lack of auditing cannot
be overemphasized. It is a crucial point,
which conflicts with the findings of the
previous paragraphs, but easily dominates
the other effects. In the absence of reason-
able accounting, price cap regulation is the
only way out. It is only through price cap
reviews that some cost elements can be
brought in, leading to some cost-plus shift
through the ratchet effect (see below).
1 2 3
3b%
3ˆb
3b
1ˆb
1b
'
3bˆ%
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Making cost information public may be a
way for the regulator to improve the qual-
ity of accounting by fostering more truth-
ful disclosure of information by the firm,
establishing its credibility for honest be-
havior.
HIERARCHICAL REGULATION
AND CORRUPTION
The next point to consider is the need to
devolve regulation to the regulatory agen-
cies or ministries. A main role of these
institutions is to partially bridge the infor-
mational gap between public decisionmak-
ers and the regulated firm. This gives rise
to another issue, the possible capture of the
regulatory agency by the firm. Such collu-
sion will occur with greater probability if
the stakes of collusion are high, if the cost
of side transfers between the firm and the
regulator are low, and if no incentive
mechanism is in place for the regulators.
The stake of collusion amounts to the in-
formation rent that an efficient firm ob-
tains when the regulator hides the fact that
it is efficient. From our previous analysis,
it is increasing with the level of effort cho-
sen by the less-efficient firm (since it is
equivalent to the gain obtained by an effi-
cient firm when it mimics an inefficient
one). The maximum bribe that a firm will
be willing to offer to the agency is this
stake. However, it should be discounted by
the price of internal transfers, which in-
cludes the cost of being discovered as well
as the need to use often-indirect transfers
that are less efficient than monetary trans-
fers. Capture is avoided if the agency is
paid an amount larger than the discounted
value of the stake of collusion when it re-
veals the firm is efficient (we will call this
constraint the collusion-proof constraint).
In the simplest cases, the regulatory re-
sponse to the fear of capture is to satisfy
the collusion-proof constraint at the lowest
possible cost. This includes shifting opti-
mal regulation toward cost-plus schemes
to decrease the stake of collusion, and im-
proving monitoring to increase the cost of
side transfers (see Box 4).
Three features of developing countries call
for even higher shifts toward cost-plus
mechanisms. First, we can expect a lower
cost of internal transfers because of less
stringent monitoring of illegal activities.
Second, incentive payments to the agency
are more costly because of the higher cost
of public funds. Third, it may be politically
more difficult to create such strong incen-
tive payments.
So far we have dealt with a case where the
optimal regulatory response entails no
corruption. If we extend the framework to
a case where, for example, regulators are
more or less susceptible to being corrupted
(some requiring low bribes, others requir-
ing higher bribes), it may be optimal to let
some corruption occur if the proportion of
regulators requiring low bribes is small
enough. Creating incentive payments that
suppress the corruption of this type of
regulators would be too costly, because the
high payments required to fight corruption
would have to be incurred even for the
other type of regulators (for whom it is not
necessary). Then, the same features of
developing countries, which militate in
favor of low-powered incentive schemes
(high cost of public funds, poor auditing
technologies), suggest that it is optimal to
let more corruption happen at equilib-
rium.10
Therefore, the effect of corruption appears
complex. If we consider corruption of cost
auditing it calls for higher power incen-
tives, but if we consider corruption in in-
formation reporting, lower powered incen-
tives are required.
                                               
10 See also Laffont and Meleu (2000) for an analy-
sis of how the separation of regulatory powers may
help fight corruption.
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Box 4:
Regulatory Response to Capture
Suppose, in a procurement problem, that the regulator hides with probability r the fact that
the firm has an efficiency parameter b when this parameter can be either b or b b>  with
b b bD = - .
If the government offers a price cap regulation *p eb= -  corresponding to the cost of an
inefficient firm exerting the cost decreasing efficient effort level *e , the rent of the b-firm is
( *)p eb b- - = D  with an expected social cost (with respect to first-best regulation) of
rln bD  if l is the deadweight loss of social funds and n  the probability that the firm is effi-
cient.
Suppose instead the regulator offers a cost plus scheme. Then cost is b (resp. b) for an effi-
cient (resp. inefficient) firm, since effort is zero in both cases. Then, the social cost of this
regulation (with respect to first-best regulation) is (1 ) *el+ . No corruption occurs in this
type of regulation.
The move to low powered incentives is better than corrupted high-powered regulation if
(1 ) *el rln b+ < D  or *e rn b< D if we do not include the firm's profit in the social welfare
function.
The higher the level r of corruption, the more likely it is worth moving to the cost plus
scheme which is a low powered incentive scheme which destroys the stake of corruption.
However, note that we assumed here that the auditing of cost itself was not corrupted.
COMMITMENT
Let us consider now the important issue of
commitment, more specifically, the fact
that governments in developing countries
have even less credibility to commit to
long-run regulatory rules than those in
developed countries.
A lack of commitment puts the ratchet
effect into motion. Faced with incentives
in the first periods, firms fear that taking
advantage today of these incentives (effi-
cient firms make more money by having
low costs) will lead to more demanding
incentive schemes in the future. The way
to commit credibly to not expropriate rents
in the future is to learn nothing today
about the firms' efficiency. Instead of of-
fering, as in the static case, a menu of
contracts with variable sharing of over-
runs, which induces self-selection, the
extreme attitude is to offer a single con-
tract which induces under-effort of the
good type and higher-than-first-best effort
of the bad type. The inefficiency created
by the lack of commitment is an inappro-
priate provision of effort levels over the
various periods, which has no simple in-
terpretation in terms of the power of in-
centive schemes. In the case of linear
schemes it can be shown (Freixas et al.
1985) that the ratchet effect pushes toward
high-powered schemes that create higher
rents in the first period to induce the reve-
lation of types. More generally, the less
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commitment ability there is, the less the
regulator should try to separate types and
the more so if the cost of public funds is
high.
The lack of ability of regulators to commit
can be mitigated by the repetition of their
relationship with the firms and the build-
ing of the regulators' reputation of not ex-
propriating the rents derived from future
efficiency improvements.11 It can be ex-
pected that this substitute to commitment
of institutions will be less easy to achieve
in developing countries.
No general analysis exists of how easy
commitment is, depending on the type of
regulatory regime. Regulatory institutions
must be particularly scrutinized in devel-
oping countries for their ability to provide
long-run incentives through their power of
commitment, since a major goal is to at-
tract foreign investment. For example,
price capping has been pushed in the
Western world as a way to provide high-
powered incentives. However, price caps
                                               
11 See Gilbert and Newbery (1988) for a model of
infinitely repeated contracting in which some col-
lusive equilibria do not exhibit the trading ineffi-
ciencies associated with shorter horizons.
are regularly renegotiated while a com-
mitment to a fair rate of return might be
less prone to costly renegotiations
(Greenwald 1984).12
WEAKNESS OF THE RULE OF LAW
Enforcement of regulatory rules is poor in
developing countries (see Box 5) for two
reasons. First, enforcement is costly, and
optimal enforcement decreases with the
cost of public funds. Second, the principal
agent paradigm with full bargaining power
attributed to the regulator does not fit the
reality of developing nations. Note how-
ever that weakness in the bargaining posi-
tion at the renegotiation stage calls for
increased investment in enforcement. Fi-
nally, corruption of the enforcement
mechanism itself or of the regulatory
mechanism calls for less enforcement.
Thus, the weakness of the rule of law in
developing countries is not only due to
poor human resources, it is also part of an
optimal regulatory response (see Laffont,
2001).
                                               
12 However, one can also commit to a fair renego-
tiation of price caps.
Box 5
Enforcement Failures in Telecommunications.
In Ghana, the incumbent monopoly for fixed telephony, which was not allowed to enter
the mobile business eventually did enter the market and used all kinds of tactics to de-
lay interconnection.
In Tanzania, the regulator attempted to enforce regional mobile licenses. However, the
dominant operator, Mobitel, argued that its license was national and launched service in
an area where the regulator tried to shut down the operator.  After a crisis involving the
Court and the country's President all cellular licenses were declared national in scope.
In Côte d'Ivoire, the incumbent monopolist priced access for competing public phones
in a way that foreclosed entry. The regulator intervened in 1998 to set a minimum price
for the incumbent's prices at its own call boxes to allow entry. However, until recently
the incumbent refused to adjust its prices.
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FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
Financial constraints compound the diffi-
culties of asymmetric information for
regulation in many circumstances. The
basic intuition can be stated in simple
moral hazard control problems with risk
neutrality. Moral hazard in a delegated
activity can be controlled without giving
up a rent to the agent if penalties are pos-
sible even when the observation of the
performance is noisy. However, if such
penalties are not possible because of lim-
ited liability constraints, only rewards for
good performance can induce appropriate
effort levels, i.e., information rents must
be given up.
The greater the financial constraints the
greater those rents. Both the strength of
financial constraints and the high cost of
public funds favor a shift toward less pow-
erful incentive schemes in developing
countries. The irony of the situation is that,
even though these countries should make
more effort to emerge from underdevel-
opment, inducing effort is much more dif-
ficult in developing countries.
SUMMING UP
This section has detailed the many argu-
ments that favor a move toward less pow-
erful incentive schemes (and, therefore, a
move toward less efficiency) in developing
countries.
However, the use of performance evalua-
tion to improve the fundamental trade-offs
between efficiency and rent extraction
presumes a perfect, or at least unbiased,
auditing of that performance. The main
argument against such advice is the cost
padding effect and the corruption of the
cost audits which, on the contrary, favor
fixed-price mechanisms that save all the
auditing costs.
Thus, we may distinguish three stages of
development concerning regulation. In the
first stage, the auditing mechanisms are so
poor that powerful incentive schemes
should be advocated. They promote short-
run efficiency in activities that are immune
to ratchet effects, but they strongly favor
ex post inequality (since the efficient types
make more money than the inefficient
ones), they encourage some types of cor-
ruption of regulatory and political institu-
tions, and they are costly for the rest of the
economy because they create a money
drain toward the regulated monopolies.
This first stage should be used to develop a
good auditing system. Once it is in place,
one can move rather discontinuously to
stage two of development by promoting
less powerful incentive schemes for the
reasons explained above. Then, as devel-
opment continues, the optimal solution is
to slowly move toward more powerful
incentive schemes in stage three. The
quality of regulation in each of these
stages depends critically on the ability of
the government to commit credibly to the
implementation of the schemes.
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4. Promoting Competition by Pricing Access
Let us again distinguish between the three
market structures considered in Section 2
to discuss appropriate access pricing rules
in developing countries.
VERTICAL DISINTEGRATION
Consider the simplest case where the final
services are produced by competitive in-
dustries at constant marginal costs. Ram-
sey pricing tells us that the access price
markup over the marginal cost of access
for a given good relative to the access
price for this good should be inversely
proportional to its demand price elasticity.
Such a pricing scheme can be decentral-
ized; price caps can be applied to the
regulated firm in charge of the infrastruc-
ture, relying in this way on the firm's de-
mand information. Of course, that infor-
mation is the province of the users of the
infrastructure. The utility can infer this
demand information from the demand for
access as long as the users report truthfully
the type of final good for which they use
the infrastructure.
It may be difficult to promote such truthful
reporting in developing countries when
inspection systems are easily corrupted.
Moreover, price discrimination resulting
from sophisticated Ramsey pricing may be
manipulated by interest groups (see Laf-
font-Tirole, 1993, Chapter 11). Conse-
quently, in the case of developing coun-
tries Ramsey pricing should be based on
broad categories of usage that do not raise
complex inspection issues and should be
decentralized by price caps.
Another concern in developing countries is
the market power of users of the infra-
structure. However, the regulation should
not attempt to undo, via access pricing
policy, the monopoly power of the users of
the infrastructure. Indeed, such a policy
requires a lot of knowledge from the
regulator and raises issues of favoritism. In
the absence of long-term contracts, there is
a potential for expropriation of some large
users' investments, which is quite negative
for attracting foreign capital. In this case,
other policies should be used to foster the
competitive use of the infrastructure (see
Section 5).
The discretion surrounding the determina-
tion of price elasticities and raising the
problem of capture is transferred to the
choice of weights when using price caps.
A nondiscretionary method for choosing
weights in the price cap, such as last year’s
quantities (plus an exogenous change in
the level) should be selected in developing
countries.
ONE WAY ACCESS
WITH VERTICAL INTEGRATION
We consider now the case of a vertically
integrated utility that provides access to
the infrastructure and also sells a service
using the infrastructure (the incumbent),
and discuss two sub-cases.
Suppose first that the competitive users of
the infrastructure provide an imperfect
substitute to the service provided by the
incumbent (mobile phones versus fixed
link telephony with a lot of unsatisfied
demand). In this case, regulation of access
should be treated just like regulation of an
end-user service, because the incumbent
will be willing to provide access that in-
creases its business with little effect on its
own service market. For example, global
price caps including final goods as well as
access goods can be used. (See Laffont-
Tirole (2000), Chapter 6.)
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The situation is more difficult when com-
petitive users offer services that are very
close substitutes of the services provided
by the incumbent. Then, the Ramsey rule
tells us that the access price should be high
enough to avoid inefficient business steal-
ing and to balance the budget of the in-
cumbent. One is tempted to favor a gener-
ous (for the incumbent) access-pricing
rule, such as efficient component pricing,
to avoid foreclosure and to focus regula-
tory resources on implementing quick and
high quality interconnection. Alternatively,
one can use a global price cap supple-
mented by maximum prices determined
with the efficient component-pricing rule.
It should be recognized that it is a very
difficult case requiring a lot of regulatory
expertise, making it difficult to implement
good solutions in developing countries.
Indeed, examples from Colombia, Ghana,
China and elsewhere show that incumbents
in the telecommunications industry are
using various strategies to avoid competi-
tion (foreclosure, delays, raising rival's
cost… ).
TWO WAY ACCESS FOR
COMPETITION IN
INFRASTRUCTURES
When there is competition in infrastruc-
tures, as is the case of telecommunications,
in particular, final prices are usually de-
regulated but the regulation of access
prices remains an issue. For example, in
the Internet, the bill-and-keep doctrine
amounts to a zero access charge, some-
thing that is currently being debated (see
Laffont et al., 2001).
According to the literature, access prices in
telecommunications should be regulated
because firms (at least for symmetric net-
work) can use access charges to collude
against consumers (high access charges
induce high final prices) and to block entry
(see Armstrong, 1998 and Laffont et al,
1998a and 1998b). One possible solution
is to impose the bill-and-keep doctrine
because of its simplicity and because it
encourages competition in final prices.
Box 6
Colombia
A Constitutional amendment prohibits monopolies in Colombia, even public ones.
Several regional public companies offer local telephony (Bogota Telecom Company:
25 %, Medellin: 10 %, Cali: 7 %), and there are four mobile companies.
There appears to be no problem in setting interconnection charges for mobile and long
distance service. The services are sufficiently complementary so that both operators
gain from quick interconnection. However, concern remains regarding high access
charges.
But, when the Telecom and Medellin companies entered the local market in Bogota,
Bogota Telecom refused them access. As a result, there are now three fixed-link com-
panies in Bogota that are not fully interconnected. Indeed, access charges are not in-
cluded in the price cap on final prices or determined by historical costs according to
the fully distributed method. Since Bogota Telecom makes no money on access, it
has all the incentives to engage in exclusionary behavior.
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A more difficult situation occurs when
networks are asymmetric in size or traffic.
In particular, it is important to ensure that
network competition does not interfere
with network development.
The regulator may mandate negotiations
for interconnection under the threat of ar-
bitration by an international body. It is
unlikely that he will often have the infor-
mation to choose access prices itself. This
is an area where it is particularly clear that
it is not enough to declare that competition
is possible or even to sell licenses for
competition to really take place. The in-
ability to ensure fair competition may even
delay competition and lead to implemen-
tation of the alternative option, that is, of
regulating the monopolist with a strict
program for developing the network.
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5.  Competition Policy
We have argued that competition policy is
not appropriate to deal with the complex
and rapidly evolving technical issues con-
cerning the interface between the competi-
tive and noncompetitive segments of infra-
structure industries. It remains to be seen
what kind of competition policy is appro-
priate for the potentially competitive seg-
ments.
Three ingredients are needed for competi-
tion. First, there must be enough firms or
potential entrants into an industry. Second,
those firms must not enter into collusive
side-contracts. Furthermore, if a firm has
developed a dominant position through
innovation it should not abuse this posi-
tion.
It should first be stressed that, in most de-
veloping countries, the major problem is
the dearth of participants, particularly in
infrastructures where investments are usu-
ally sunk for long periods. As a result, the
major problem is how to attract local or
foreign capital to those industries, that is,
how to create the conditions that make
investment attractive. The work required
to favor entry is not the usual task of a
competition agency. Unfortunately, it con-
cerns most of the characteristics of devel-
oping countries that were discussed earlier
and which cannot be easily resolved: inef-
ficient financial sectors, lack of credibility
of institutions, lack of enforcement of
laws, inefficient transportation and com-
munications, lack of information available
to consumers, etc., what Carlin and Se-
abright (2000) refer to as "competitive
infrastructure."
This is particularly the case in infrastruc-
tures where technologies favor high con-
centration and international trade cannot
be relied upon to create competitive pres-
sures. The difficult question is: which rate
of return will attract the optimal level of
investment? If this optimal rate were
known, competition policy should ensure
this rate and no more. Probably, this can
be achieved more easily through conces-
sion contracts with regulated prices than
with competition in infrastructures.
More traditional competition policy can be
relied upon in the case of the competitive
use of infrastructure. As observed by Rey
(1997), collusion is facilitated by entry
barriers, market concentration and capacity
constraints, and these factors are more
likely to be present in developing coun-
tries. As already observed, the transaction
costs of collusion are also likely to be
lower in developing countries. Similarly,
predatory strategies may be particularly
dangerous in countries where credit mar-
kets are weak. Rey (1997) argues also that
the high entry barriers often found in de-
veloping countries give more force to the
market foreclosure argument when dis-
cussing the essential facility doctrine. He
also recommends a more cautious attitude
toward vertical restraints.
Competition policy during the liberaliza-
tion process should apply to the competi-
tive segments of the deregulated industry;
namely, generation in electricity, long
distance service in telecommunication, and
operating services in transportation. This is
particularly important in developing coun-
tries where attracting capital for infra-
structure investment generally requires
giving sizeable market shares to investing
firms.
In particular, merger and acquisition rules
in developing countries must be designed
with an emphasis on simplicity, nondis-
cretion, and adaptability to rapidly chang-
ing market structures. One possibility is to
establish explicit market share constraints
(foregoing efficiency arguments), which
are revised periodically.
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Some industries may need more innovative
combinations of regulation and competi-
tion. For example, under normal condi-
tions, the electricity industry may be ap-
propriately competitive and need only the
oversight of competition authorities. How-
ever, when capacity constraints are bind-
ing, either under conditions of peak de-
mand or because of supply shocks, gen-
eration firms may enjoy such power in
local markets that price regulation be-
comes necessary.
More generally, the difficulty in attracting
capital generates market structures that are
imperfectly competitive and calls for a
more intrusive regulation of behavior than
classical competition policy. It also creates
conflicts between privatization committees
or regulatory institutions, which are well
aware of the constraints on competition
imposed by the need to attract capital, and
the competition authorities, which ex post
tend to breach the explicit or implicit
agreements that restrict competition.
In any case, it should be clear that US-
style competition policy (with its armada
of lawyers and economists) is neither af-
fordable nor achievable in developing
countries. Designing simple and transpar-
ent rules for developing countries, par-
ticularly to prevent horizontal collusion
and abuse of dominant position, remains a
worthy task. Nevertheless, the benefits that
can be expected from competition policy
are quite small in the foreseeable future for
several reasons.
The lack of adequately trained staff is par-
ticularly acute. The complexities and am-
biguities of the economic analysis of such
questions as predatory behavior and verti-
cal restraints make this a particularly vex-
ing problem. As a result, emerging indus-
tries will be necessarily highly monopolis-
tic and interest groups will have consider-
able potential for interference.
Yet, competition agencies should be de-
veloped. Their first major goal is to play
an educational role by advocating the so-
cial benefits of fair competition and con-
centrating on specific goals. For example,
competition is weak in developing coun-
tries because transactions are localized as a
result of poor communications systems
and inefficient trading organizations. Fo-
cusing attention on these areas should be
particularly fruitful.
Finally, in pushing for competition in in-
frastructures it must be remembered that a
major goal is to achieve greater population
coverage in access to basic public services.
When properly13 used, monopoly provi-
sion, which allows cross-subsidies, is a
powerful redistributive instrument. Com-
petition makes redistribution via prices
more difficult, and there are not always
easy substitutes in countries with very in-
efficient and often corrupt tax systems (see
Beato, 2000; Laffont and N'Gbo, 2000).
Then, it may be easier to achieve universal
service obligations within a concession
contract than through oligopolistic compe-
tition
                                               
13 In addition to favoritism and rent-seeking, cross-
subsidies may induce inefficient bypass and create
poor incentives for service quality provision and
proper coverage of underpriced consumers.
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6.  Conclusion
This paper has highlighted the departures
from developed countries’ practices that
are required in developing countries on the
basis of normative economic theory. How-
ever, a number of caveats must be borne in
mind.
First, more empirical work is needed to
more precisely describe the specific fea-
tures of developing countries that are rele-
vant for regulatory economics. Such work
should naturally lead to distinguishing
various stages of development and to ob-
taining a classification of countries re-
quiring differentiated policies.
Second, even though we have mentioned
some characteristics of governments, a
broader political economy of reform, tak-
ing into account specific historical and
political situations is necessary.
Third, liberalization, competition and
regulatory policies are very recent devel-
opments, especially in the very poor coun-
tries. The empirical evidence is limited and
not of easy access. Moreover, it is never in
a form that would allow rigorous
econometric tests. Case studies and theory
are the only available tools that can be
used under these circumstances, but this
should be done with a lot of caution, in
particular because the economic theory
relevant for developing countries is so far
only sketchy.
Nevertheless, we hope that this paper pro-
vides a useful framework for those who
have the difficult task of advising devel-
oping country authorities on more efficient
ways of providing public services.
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